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Abstract 
Transaction costs associated with program management are a component of 
acquisition cost that is often overlooked when estimating the total costs of a DoD 
program. This research explores the possibility that transaction costs may be related 
to major defense acquisition program (MDAP) cost breaches. We examine the two 
questions: (1) Is there a relation between MDAP transaction costs and cost 
breaches? and (2) Are cost breaches related to the amount, or percentage of total 
costs, spent on MDAP transaction costs? Using systems engineering and program 
management (SE/PM) costs as a proxy for transaction costs, we analyze the level of 
SE/PM expenditures in MDAPs to determine whether a relationship exists between 
transaction costs and cost breaches. Contract type and program maturity are also 
considered. Logistic regression models are used to examine the occurrence of 
program breaches in MDAPs. We find a positive relationship that is significant at the 
5% (p = .05) level between the likelihood of a cost breach occurring and estimate at 
completion SE/PM cost ratio. On average, for a 1% increase in the SE/PM cost ratio, 
there is a corresponding 0.8% increase in the likelihood that a cost breach will occur. 
When maturity and contract type are included in the model, the average effect of the 
SE/PM cost ratio on the likelihood of a cost breach increases to 1% for cost-plus 
contracts at a significance level of 10% (p = .10). Although SE/PM cost ratio and 
cost breaches are shown to be related, it cannot be assumed that transaction costs 
are a causal factor for cost breaches. 
Keywords: transaction costs, cost breach, major defense acquisition 
program, MDAP, systems engineering, program management, SE/PM cost ratio 
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Transaction Costs and Cost Breaches in 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) uses the acquisition process to provide 
support and services for military operations. Weapon system acquisitions fall into 
three categories: Acquisition Category (ACAT) I, II, or III. ACAT I programs are those 
estimated to have expenditures greater than $365 million in research, development, 
technology, and engineering (RDT&E) or $2.19 billion in procurement, including all 
planned increments, in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars; in addition, programs 
may be designated as ACAT I by the under secretary of defense for acquisition, 
technology and logistics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], Enclosure 3, Table 1). ACAT I programs 
are commonly referred to as major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). 
Acquisition programs that do not meet the requirements for ACAT I are categorized 
as ACAT II or III programs. This report focuses on cost overruns for ACAT I 
programs.  
A 2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that 
“inaccurate cost estimates are responsible for the strongest correlation with net cost 
growth changes and are associated with 40 percent of the accumulated cost 
overruns” (p. 2). A 2007 RAND study on the cost growth in DoD weapons systems 
analyzed total program and procurement cost growth for 46 programs. The study 
determined that the cost growth ratio across all programs was 1.46 more than the 
cost estimate for Milestone B (program initiation; Younossi et al, 2007, p. xvi). 
According to the GAO, active MDAPs in FY 2011 collectively experienced a cost 
growth of $74.4 billion. The size and frequency of cost overruns in MDAPs suggest 
that there may be a component of acquisition cost that is not fully considered in 
MDAP cost estimates.  
This report examines transaction costs, a component of system cost that is 
not explicitly included in most cost estimates. Is there a relationship between 
transaction costs and cost overruns in MDAPs? A better understanding of this 
relationship could help explain the differences between actual and estimated costs in 
MDAPs, perhaps leading to more complete cost estimates and possibly improved 
forecasting of cost breaches.  
To measure transaction costs, we use a proxy measure first suggested by 
Angelis, Dillard, Franck, and Melese in 2008 that includes systems engineering (SE) 
and program management (PM) costs reported by MDAP contractors. According to 
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MIL-STD-881C (DoD, 2011), system engineering is defined as “the technical and 
management efforts of directing and controlling a totally integrated engineering effort 
of a system or program” (p. 222), and program management is defined as “the 
business and administrative planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, 
and approval actions designated to accomplish overall program objectives, which 
are not associated with specific hardware elements and are not included in systems 
engineering” (p. 222).  
A SE/PM ratio based on the total program cost is developed to allow 
comparison of transaction costs across different programs. For purposes of this 
study, a cost overrun is defined as a cost breach of 10% or greater as reported by 
the MDAP program manager. A cost breach occurs when program costs exceed the 
approved acquisition program baseline (APB).1 It seems reasonable to assume that 
the SE/PM costs may increase as program managers respond to actual or 
anticipated increases in program costs. Can cost breaches be related to the amount 
of SE/PM cost in a program? 
Department of Defense (DoD) Cost Estimation 
Cost estimates provide the DoD, Congress, and program managers with the 
information needed to determine whether a program is affordable and cost-effective. 
A good cost estimate should provide a reasonable prediction of the costs associated 
with a program throughout its life cycle, to include research and development (R&D) 
costs, production and construction costs, operation and support costs, and 
retirement and disposal costs. Acquisition costs, which consist of the R&D costs and 
the production and construction costs, compose a significant portion of a program’s 
estimated life-cycle cost. 
The Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is responsible for overseeing DoD cost 
estimation policy and procedures and providing independent life-cycle cost 
estimates for MDAPs (Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009). A primary 
responsibility of the CAPE is to provide independent analytic advice to the secretary 
of defense on the cost-effectiveness of defense systems (Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation [CAPE], 2013a). DoD Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures 
(DoD 5000.4-M) provides cost-estimating guidance for DoD programs (DoD, 1992). 
In addition to the independent life-cycle cost estimate, DoD Instruction 5000.2 and 
DoD 5000.2-M require that a program office estimate and DoD component cost 
analysis estimate also be performed (DoD, 1992, p. 8). These three estimates are 
                                            
1 The APB is the baseline that reflects the threshold and objective values for the minimum number of 
cost, schedule, and performance attributes that describe the program over its life cycle (Defense 
Acquisition University [DAU], 2011b).   
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based on the MDAP cost analysis requirements description (CARD), a document 
which provides an overview of the technical and programmatic features of an 
acquisition program. In accordance with DoDI 5000.02, Enclosure 4, Table 2, 
independent cost estimates for ACAT ID2 programs must be provided by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group before entering the 
Technology Development phase (Milestone A), the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development phase (Milestone B, or program initiation), the Production and 
Deployment phase (Milestone C), and the full-rate production decision review 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2008). 
A 1972 GAO report titled Theory and Practice of Cost Estimating for Major 
Acquisitions noted that cost-estimating techniques across DoD programs were 
inconsistent in their level of detail and that the cost-estimating techniques used for 
DoD programs varied widely. The GAO believed these practices resulted in 
inaccurate, typically low, cost estimates which often led to cost overruns. Some of 
the problems noted by the GAO include the following: 
 known costs had been excluded without adequate or valid justification; 
 historical cost data used for computing estimates were sometimes 
invalid, unreliable, or unrepresentative; 
 understanding the proper use of the estimates was hindered because 
the estimates were too low; 
 readily retrievable cost data that could serve in computing cost 
estimates for new weapon systems were generally lacking; and 
 organized and systematic efforts were not made to gather actual cost 
information to achieve comparability between data collected on various 
weapon systems or to see whether the cost data the contractors 
reported were accurate and consistent. 
In response to these findings, the GAO developed a list of basic 
characteristics of credible cost estimates, which are still applicable today. 
Unfortunately, GAO reports continue to provide evidence of poor cost estimating in 
DoD programs (see, for example, GAO, 2011, 2012, and 2013). In 2009, GAO Cost 
Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing 
Capital Program Costs was published in an effort to help government managers 
improve acquisition cost estimates (GAO, 2009b).  
Cost estimates are expected to change and presumably become more 
accurate as a program matures. These refinements are largely due to lessening 
                                            
2  The “D” refers to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), which advises the USD(AT&L) at major 
decision points. 
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uncertainty surrounding the specific program requirements and technology and more 
certainty regarding actual costs as expenditures are incurred. To ensure a realistic 
cost estimate, it is important that the estimate be periodically reevaluated and 
updated to account for requirements changes, actual cost expenditures, and the 
latest version of the program’s schedule (GAO, 2009b, p. 37). The GAO stated that  
relying on a standard process that emphasizes pinning down the 
technical scope of the work, communicating the basis on which the 
estimate is built, identifying the quality of the data, determining the 
level of risk, and thoroughly documenting the effort should result in 
cost estimates that are defensible, consistent, and trustworthy. (GAO, 
2009b, p. 12) 
Cost Breaches in Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs 
Controlling cost growth for MDAPs has been problematic in the DoD for many 
years (Arena, Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006). Selected Acquisition Reports 
(SARs) were introduced in 1967 to better monitor MDAP performance. The 
information found in the SAR provides the DoD and Congress a summary of the 
MDAP’s ability to meet cost, performance, and schedule objectives agreed upon by 
the program manager and defense acquisition executive. If a program exceeds an 
established cost threshold, a breach has occurred and the program manager must 
provide an explanation in the SAR (which is generally brief) of how or why the cost 
breach occurred. The default threshold value for a cost breach is 10% cost growth 
over the acquisition program baseline (usually the original cost estimate approved at 
program initiation). The various types of cost breaches and their cost appropriation 
categories are explained later in this section. 
In 1981, Senator Samuel Nunn and Congressman David McCurdy introduced 
the Nunn–McCurdy Amendment (10 U.S.C. § 2433, 2006) in an effort to control 
MDAP cost growth by holding the DoD accountable to Congress for management of 
program costs. The Nunn–McCurdy Amendment became law with the FY 1983 
Department of Defense Authorization Act (1982), which establishes consequences 
for MDAPs which exceed cost thresholds. These consequences include that the 
secretary of defense provide Congress with program cost estimates using original 
and current requirements, as well as certification to Congress that the unit costs are 
reasonable and that the management structure of the program is adequate to control 
future costs (GAO, 2009b, pp. 310–311). 
Types of Cost Breaches in the DoD 
There are six categories of appropriations where cost breaches often occur: 
average procurement unit cost (APUC); program acquisition unit cost (PAUC); 
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procurement; RDT&E; military construction (MILCON); and acquisition-related 
operations and maintenance (O&M). Each of these cost breach categories was 
included in the data set for this study. The following definitions are from the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) Glossary (DAU, 2011b) and the DAMIR SAR Data 
Entry Instructions (OUSD[AT&L], 2011). 
AverageProcurement Unit Cost (APUC) 
Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) is the unit cost that equals the 
program acquisition cost (the sum of all procurement funds) divided by the total 
number of fully configured end items to be procured. For unit cost reporting and APB 
breach purposes, the APUC is calculated in base-year dollars. Base-year dollars are 
calculated by using the currently approved APB. 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) is the unit cost that equals the total 
program acquisition cost (including development, procurement and construction) 
divided by the program acquisition quantity (i.e., the total number of fully configured 
end items). For unit cost reporting and APB breach purposes, the PAUC is 
calculated in base-year dollars. Base-year dollars are calculated by using the 
currently approved APB. 
Procurement 
Procurement appropriations fund those acquisition programs that have been 
approved for production (to include low-rate initial production [LRIP] of acquisition 
objective quantities) and all costs integral and necessary to deliver a useful end item 
intended for operational use or inventory upon delivery (DAU, 2011b). 
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
RDT&E appropriations fund the efforts performed by contractors and 
government activities required for the R&D of equipment, material, computer 
application software, and their test and evaluation (T&E) including initial operational 
test and evaluation (IOT&E) and live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E). RDT&E also 
funds the operation of dedicated R&D installation activities for the conduct of R&D 
programs (DAU, 2011b). 
Military Construction (MILCON) 
MILCON appropriations fund major projects such as bases, schools, missile 
storage facilities, maintenance facilities, medical/dental clinics, libraries, and military 
family housing (DAU, 2011b). Military construction costs include only those projects 
that directly support and are uniquely identified with the subject program (DAMIR, 
2011). 
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Acquisition Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
Acquisition Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations fund 
expenses such as civilian salaries, travel, minor construction projects, operating 
military forces, training and education, depot maintenance, stock funds, and base 
operations support (DAU, 2011b). Acquisition-related O&M costs may include 
acquisition costs which, in special cases, have been funded by O&M (DAMIR, 2011). 
Measuring Cost Breaches in the DoD 
A cost threshold breach is considered to occur when cost expenditures 
exceed the approved baseline cost estimate for an MDAP—also known as the APB. 
The initial APB cost estimate is established early in the acquisition phase when there 
may be a considerable amount of uncertainty about specific requirements and 
technology. In some cases that estimate should to be revised due changes in 
mission requirements, technology development, or other circumstances. This results 
in a rebaselining of the program, which must be officially approved by the milestone 
decision authority.3 The initial APB is referred to as the original baseline, and for a 
rebaselined program, the revised APB is called the current baseline. If an MDAP has 
been officially rebaselined, cost breaches are measured relative to the current 
baseline.  
Nunn–McCurdy legislation is the current federal law used to monitor and 
control MDAP cost growth. There have been changes to the Nunn–McCurdy Act 
over the years, most notably in FY 2006 and FY 2009. In 2006, the original baseline 
estimate was established as a threshold for measuring cost growth. This prevents a 
program from rebaselining simply to avoid a Nunn–McCurdy cost threshold breach. 
In 2009, Congress endorsed a requirement that any program with a critical breach 
(defined below) is presumed terminated unless that program has been certified by 
the Secretary of Defense.4  
Nunn–McCurdy cost threshold breaches, or cost overruns, are based on 
original cost estimates for PAUC and APUC at project completion and in the case of 
a program which has rebaselined, cost threshold breaches are also based on the 
current (i.e., rebaselined) cost estimate for PAUC and APUC at project completion. 
For the purposes of this report, a cost breach is any cost breach reported in the SAR 
that is greater than or equal to 10% above the APB. The type of cost threshold 
breach and the APB baseline that it is compared against is shown in Table 1. 
                                            
3 More information about the rebaselining process can be found in DoD Instruction 5000.02, 
Enclosure 4, Table 6 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008). 
4 More information about MDAP certification requirements can be found in Public Law 111–23 
(Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 2009); DoDI 5000.02 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008); and 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Chapter 10 (DAU, 2011a). 
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Table 1. Nunn–McCurdy Cost Breach Thresholds 















Figure 1 can be used to illustrate cost overrun calculations. The total 
allocated budget is the sum of all of the budgets for work on a contract plus the 
management reserve (an amount withheld by the program manager for risk 
management purposes). The budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) represents 
the total amount budgeted for work packages that are open or completed at any 
given point in time. The budgeted cost of work scheduled (BCWS) represents the 
total amount budgeted for the work that was scheduled for completion at a given 
point in time. The BCWS line represents the contract’s overall time-phased budget 
plan and will equal the program baseline or budget at completion (BAC) on the date 
all work is scheduled to finish (completion date). The actual cost of work performed 
(ACWP) is the sum of actual costs that have been incurred to accomplish the work 
performed as of a point in time.  
 
Figure 1. Earned Value Management  
(DAU, 2014) 
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The estimate at completion (EAC) is the sum of the ACWP and the estimate 
to completion (ETC) for the remaining work. The ETC can be calculated using the 
cost performance index (CPI) and the schedule performance index (SPI). The CPI is 
calculated by dividing BCWP by ACWP and is a measure of cost efficiency. The SPI 
is calculated by dividing BCWP by BCWS and is a measure of schedule efficiency. 
The formula for calculating ETC is 
    (1) 
When the EAC, a cost estimate for the total cost of the contract, is higher than 
the BAC, the baseline cost estimate of the contract, a cost overrun is projected. To 
calculate the expected cost overrun the current cost estimate must be revised to 
incorporate actual costs (ACWP). This adjusted EAC is then compared to the BAC, 
the acquisition program baseline for the contract. The percentage of cost overrun 
projected can be calculated using the following equation: 
Projected	%	Cost	Overrun	 	 100 100    (2) 
Figure 1 also illustrates the cost and schedule overruns for a contract or 
series of contracts at project completion. The actual completion date is often delayed 
when there are cost overruns.5 A revised completion date is shown by the dashed 
line on the far right of the graph. At this revised completion date, the cost difference 
between ACWP (no longer EAC because work is complete) and BAC is determined, 
and this delta defines the final size of the cost overrun. The actual cost overrun 
calculation can be made using a similar formula: 
Actual	%	Cost	Overrun	 	 100 100   (3) 
Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are the costs associated with “source selection, periodic 
competition and renegotiation, contract negotiation and management, performance 
measuring and monitoring and dispute resolutions” (Angelis et al., 2008, p.3). 
Transaction costs are driven by the complexity and riskiness of the work to be 
accomplished. Thus, transaction costs represent a cost of doing business that may 
not be completely captured in standard work breakdown structure (WBS) estimates. 
There are three generally accepted categories of transaction costs: search and 
information costs; bargaining and decision costs; and policing and enforcement 
                                            
5 In many instances, contracts exhibit a relation between cost and schedule performance. For 
example, program managers may increase the man-hours allocation of a project in order to meet a 
schedule deadline. An increase in man-hours allocation, and particularly if the work effort qualifies as 
overtime pay, may cause project costs to increase. 
( ) / ( * )ETC BAC BCWP CPI SPI 
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costs (Johnson, 2005). To illustrate these cost categories, Biggs (2013) described 
the non-monetary exchanges which occur during the marketing and purchase of a 
home. The prospective homeowners are working with a realtor to find an acceptable 
home based on its physical location, size, and other intrinsic characteristics (search 
and information costs). The prospective homeowners will then negotiate between 
their realtor and the seller’s realtor to determine a purchasing price for the home 
(bargaining and decision costs). Last, if the home was purchased using money that 
was borrowed from a mortgage lender, the mortgage company will ensure that the 
buyers are upholding their end of the agreement by paying the monthly mortgage bill 
(policing and enforcement costs). Although they are not often captured in the 
accounting records, the time and effort associated with these three types of 
transactions represent real costs to the organization.  
In general, a program has two types of costs: production costs and 
transaction costs. Production costs are usually captured in the WBS, but transaction 
costs may not be adequately captured in the WBS. Because traditional cost 
estimates are based on the production costs found in the WBS, they do not explicitly 
include transaction costs (Angelis et al., 2008). Coordination costs include search 
and information costs; bargaining and decision costs; and policing and enforcement 
costs. These costs are affected by market competition (contestability), asset 
specificity, and the recurrence or frequency of a transaction. Asset specificity, a 
manufacturer’s specialization in the production of a system or machine, may result in 
the government becoming reliant on a sole provider and may lead to opportunistic 
behavior by the manufacturer. Motivation costs are those costs which promote 
productive efforts and provide incentives to encourage investment, as well as those 
costs which deter unproductive bargaining and opportunistic behavior. Motivation 
costs are impacted by the complexity of the contract, the uncertainty or amount of 
risk that a contract presents, and the contract type. For more information about 
transaction costs see Applying Insights from Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to 
Improve DoD Cost Estimation (Angelis, Dillard, Franck, & Melese, 2007). 
Measuring Transaction Costs in the DoD 
Transaction costs are difficult to measure because they are not easily 
identified and seldom captured in the accounting records. In previous research, 
Angelis et al. (2008) examined how transaction costs might be captured in the cost 
estimates of DoD acquisition programs. To test the hypothesis that the traditional 
WBS approach may overlook some important variables resulting in low initial cost 
estimates, we should compare cost estimates for systems that included significant 
transaction costs with those of systems that did not include significant transaction 
costs. The first problem is to find a way to measure transaction costs in acquisition 
programs. Angelis et al. (2008) identified a number of issues with DoD program 
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management cost data reported for major weapon systems and found that program 
office data collected for major weapon systems is not well suited for developing a 
cost model that includes transaction cost variables. As an alternate approach, they 
explored using contractor program management data from Cost Data Summary 
Reports (DD form 1921) and suggested using the Systems Engineering/Program 
Management (SE/PM) category as a proxy for transaction costs.  
The SE/PM cost seems an appropriate proxy for transaction costs because 
program management costs and transaction costs are both defined, in part, as costs 
associated with contract management, performance measurement, and oversight 
activities. Due to differences in program accounting practices and varying 
interpretations for classifying costs as Systems Engineering or Program 
Management, it is prudent to collect the sum of SE and PM costs to ensure that all 
the appropriate costs are included in the data gathered. 
The SE/PM cost values used in this report are extracted from the WBS line 
item values for EAC SE/PM cost, which are listed on the Cost Data Summary Report 
(CDSR), DD Form 1921. The EAC SE/PM cost is the projected SE/PM cost at 
contract completion. The SE/PM costs are inclusive of the total contract costs less 
the contractor’s profit/loss or fees. 
The SE/PM Cost Ratio 
This study uses the SE/PM cost ratio for a program (the ratio of SE/PM costs 
divided by total program costs as shown in Equation 4), which specifies the 
proportion of total program costs that are dedicated to managing, integrating, and 
directing the program:  
   (4) 
The numerator of the SE/PM cost ratio is the sum of SE and PM cost 
expenditures, and the denominator is total program expenditures. A ratio is 
calculated to provide a perspective on the relative magnitude of SE/PM expenditures 
as well as to allow for comparison across different programs.  
Our hypothesis is that a higher SE/PM cost ratio is related to future cost 
threshold breaches. Our assumption is that programs with higher SE/PM cost ratios 
are in riskier contractual relationships and have higher transaction costs and will 
experience more cost overruns than those programs with lower SE/PM cost ratios. 
Categorizing an SE/PM cost ratio as high or low is a judgment call. There does not 
appear to be a directed standard or normal-practice SE/PM cost ratio definition 
across MDAPs. One reason that the SE/PM cost ratios may vary is due to the type 
of weapon system. Another reason SE/PM cost ratios differ between MDAPs, and 
SE / PM Costs
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sometimes across contracts within the same MDAPs, is due to subjective 
interpretations among contractors (and program managers) about the definition of 
SE/PM costs and non-uniform standards regarding which costs qualify to be 
categorized as SE/PM costs (Stem, Boito, & Younossi, 2006). 
This study analyzes the SE/PM cost ratio of MDAPs looking for potential 
correlation between the SE/PM ratios and cost breaches. Determining the nature of 
any potential relationship between the SE/PM cost ratio and the number of cost 
breaches experienced by a program will test the hypothesis that programs with 
higher SE/PM cost ratios will experience more cost overruns than programs with 
lower SE/PM cost ratios.  
Other Explanatory Variables 
While the SE/PM cost ratio was the focus of our research, we acknowledge 
that there are likely many other variables that are related to cost overruns (e.g., GAO, 
2011). Although it was not within the scope of this research to test other explanatory 
variables, we did record maturity and contract type for each of the programs 
selected for this study because the information was easily obtained from the 
documents we examined.  
As a program develops, it seems reasonable to assume that the uncertainty 
surrounding the program’s cost is reduced, and therefore we should expect to see 
fewer cost breaches in older programs. However, age by itself is not sufficient to 
compare different programs, since programs have different expected durations 
(schedules). A better metric is the program’s maturity, based on the design and 
technology readiness of the system. In this study, program maturity is measured by 
the time elapsed since Milestone B, the entry point into the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase. For a program to receive approval to begin 
Milestone B in the DoD, the design and technology associated with the system must 
be considered “mature”.6 This requirement provides some assurance that we are 
comparing programs in approximately the same stage of development or maturity, 
thus minimizing differences that might be explained more by the acquisition phase or 
technology readiness than by other factors such as the SE/PM cost ratio.  
The type of contract used for a program is an indication of the perceived level 
of risk associated with the execution of the contract. As the level of performance risk 
increases, the risk of cost overruns also increases and the amount of cost risk that 
the contractor is willing to assume tends to decrease. Contract types differ in how 
                                            
6 Milestone B approval authorizes an MDAP to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development phase of the acquisition process. Statutory requirements for MDAPs to achieve 
Milestone B approval are found in 10 U.S.C. § 2366b. These requirements include that the program is 
certified by the milestone decision authority to be affordable, fully funded through the Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP), and that the cost and schedule estimates are reasonable. 
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the cost risk is shared between the government and the contractor. In a firm fixed-
price contract, there is no cost sharing between the government and the contractor, 
and the contractor has full responsibility for the performance costs and resulting 
profit (or loss). In a cost-plus contract, a share ratio based on the contract cost and 
the contractor’s fee (profit) is negotiated so that the contractor has a pre-determined 
responsibility for the performance costs, which will directly affect the fee (profit). In 
the case of both contract types, incentives may be offered in which the contractor’s 
responsibility for the performance costs and the profit or fee incentives offered are 
tailored to the uncertainties involved in contract performance (FAR, 2005). By 
including contract type in our analysis, we can account for basic cost risk differences 
recognized by both the government and the contractor at the onset of the program. 
Hypothesis 
Many studies (e.g., Bolten, Leonard, Arena, Younossi, & Sollinger, 2008) 
have examined cost growth in DoD programs, yet little research has been done on 
the relationship between transaction costs and cost overruns as suggested by 
Angelis et al. in 2008. A 2006 RAND study established that MDAP SE/PM costs vary 
between programs depending on the program type (Stem et al., 2006), and Angelis 
et al. (2008) suggested using the SE/PM cost as a proxy for transaction costs to 
examine the relationship between transaction costs and cost overruns.  
This study seeks to determine the nature of any potential relationship 
between transaction costs (using the SE/PM cost ratio as a proxy) and the likelihood 
of cost breaches experienced by a program. The hypothesis is that programs with 
higher SE/PM cost ratios are more likely to experience cost breaches than programs 
with lower SE/PM cost ratios. This is based on the assumption that higher SE/PM 
cost ratios are related to riskier contractual relationships since more time, effort, and 
resources are expended to meet performance and schedule deadlines when 
compared to less risky contracts. Programs with higher transaction costs may 
experience more cost breaches as a result of those transaction costs not being 
accounted for in the original cost estimate.  
The influence diagram in Figure 2 describes the interactions between factors 
that may be associated with the occurrence of a cost breach. There are likely many 
other variables which affect cost breaches, but the variables identified in this 
influence diagram (i.e., SE/PM cost ratio, program maturity, and contract type) are 
shown because they can be represented with the data collected. The dashed lines in 
Figure 2 represent factors that one cannot observe or does not know how to observe 
and must be dealt with qualitatively or by using proxies. The solid lines represent 
factors that can be quantitatively evaluated. While the risk and complexity of a 
program may directly contribute to a cost overrun, the SE/PM efforts and the 
contract type can influence the magnitude and frequency of cost overruns as 
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measured by cost breaches. Figure 2 indicates that program maturity influences the 
risk and complexity associated with a program. Many will associate maturity with the 
technology readiness level, but we quantify maturity as the time in years since 
program initiation or Milestone B, which assumes a certain level of technology 
readiness. Figure 2 also indicates that the risk and complexity of the MDAP will 
guide program managers and contractors in their selection of an appropriate 
contract type which in turn can influence the government’s exposure to cost 
overruns. It is also likely that the risk and complexity of a program will drive the level 
of monitoring and negotiation (transaction costs) required to manage the program 
and that riskier, more complex programs will require higher levels of transaction 
costs, which may contribute to cost overruns. 
 
Figure 2. Cost Breach Influence Diagram 
Because transaction costs are difficult to quantify, the SE/PM cost ratio can 
be used as a proxy to help understand the contribution of transaction costs to a 
program’s cost overruns and subsequently the probability of the program having a 
cost breach. Of course, not all cost overruns are considered cost breaches. Current 
estimates which exceed the estimated cost of a program by any amount are 
considered a cost overrun. Cost breaches result when the amount of the cost 
overrun exceeds certain parameters defined by regulation. There are two types of 
cost breaches: APB and Nunn–McCurdy breaches. In order for a program to incur 
an APB breach, estimated program expenditures must be greater than the APB 
estimate at completion (EAC) by at least 10%. If the difference is 15% or more, it is a 
Nunn–McCurdy breach. In this report, a default value of 10% cost overrun 
constitutes a cost breach threshold.  
In this study, we examine how the SE/PM ratio is related to the probability of 
incurring a cost breach as defined above. The null hypothesis of this research states 
that better incorporation of transaction costs into cost estimates will not significantly 
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affect the ability of an MDAP to operate within its approved financial constraints as 
measured by cost breaches. 
Data Sources 
This study used two major data sources to develop the SE/PM ratio: Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SARs) and the cost and software data reporting system 
(CSDR). The data sources are discussed in the following sections. 
Selected Acquisition Reports  
The SAR is a single report which contains details of critical parameters of an 
MDAP or major automated information system (MAIS), to include the responsible 
office, threshold breaches, schedule, performance, current contracts, and cost 
details. SARs must be submitted on an annual basis and occasionally at quarterly 
intervals. The Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) 
system provides electronic copies in PDF format for active and inactive MDAPs. 
SARs contain threshold breach data and a brief explanation delineating the cause of 
the cost breach.  
MDAPs typically require several contracts to be executed, often concurrently. 
SARs provide information for the overall program and not for individual contracts. A 
SAR may list a single contract or many contracts for a single MDAP. In addition, not 
all contracts for a program may be included in the SAR. The current contract section 
of the SAR only includes “the six largest, currently active contracts (excluding 
subcontracts) that exceed $40 million in Then-Year dollars” (DAMIR, 2011). This 
means that for MDAPs listing more than one contract in a SAR, if there is a 
threshold breach it is often difficult to determine which contract(s) caused the 
threshold breach.  
Because threshold breaches are associated with contract estimates, it is 
important to identify which contract is responsible for a threshold breach. To facilitate 
our analysis, only MDAPs which listed one contract in the Contracts section of the 
SAR were selected for our study. In addition, most programs which featured 
contracts with effort numbers were excluded because the effort number in DAMIR 
does not always accurately correspond to the contract effort number in the DCARC 
database. 
According to DoD guidance, “SAR termination will be considered when 90% 
of expected program deliveries or 90% of planned acquisition expenditures have 
been made, or when Selected Acquisition Reporting criteria are no longer met” 
(DAMIR, 2011). This means that the active MDAPs found in DAMIR are between the 
beginning of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase (Milestone B) 
and 90% complete. Inactive MDAPs that are at least 90% complete are no longer 
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required to submit SARs. There are many instances where the final SAR for an 
MDAP indicates that the program is more than 90% complete, but not 100% 
complete. The use of data which may only be 90% complete is presumed 
acceptable based on the following assumptions: 
 90% of delivered product probably accounts for more than 90% of 
expenditures. 
 Experience indicates that after 90% of the budget has been expended, 
the remaining 10% of the expenditures have already been committed. 
SARs provide relatively high-level contract cost information. For this reason, it was 
decided that DAMIR would be used solely for the threshold breach data contained in 
the SARs.  
In addition to cost threshold breaches, the SAR indicates the time since 
program initiation at Milestone B, which was used in this study to indicate program 
maturity. Although the time elapsed since Milestone B for a contract may not always 
accurately represent the amount of time that an MDAP has been in existence, it was 
valid for the more recent contracts applicable to the program. 
Cost and Software Data Reporting System 
The program cost data found in the DD Form 1921 (Cost Data Summary 
Report, CDSR) provided by the Defense Cost and Resource Center (DCARC) in the 
Defense Automated Cost Information Management System (DACIMS) database 
contains significantly more contract detail than the SARs. DCARC, an entity of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD 
CAPE) organization, collects current and historical cost and resource data for 
MDAPs and MAISs. These cost and resource data are used by government cost 
analysts to develop cost estimates for government programs (CAPE, 2013b).  
The work breakdown structure (WBS) format of the CDSR allows us to obtain 
information on SE and PM costs. The Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) 
library in DACIMS contains folders of active and inactive MDAP contract data sorted 
by weapons system types. From the CDSR we can extract the line item costs that 
we need for the SE/PM cost ratio calculation. Within a single contract, it is not 
unusual to find cost data for both the prime vendor and subcontractors. To simplify 
the data collection process, only the cost data provided by the prime contractor were 
recorded for further analysis. The type of contract used for the program was also 
obtained from the CDSRs. Programs were noted as having either firm fixed price 
type contracts or cost-plus type contracts.7 
                                            
7 A cost-plus contract is a type of contract that provides for payment to the contractor of allowable 
costs incurred in the performance of the contract, to the extent prescribed in the contract. This type of 
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Data Selection8 
As noted above, cost threshold breach information categorized by 
appropriation was available from SARs in DAMIR and the expenditure items 
required to calculate the SE/PM cost ratios were available from the CDSRs found in 
DACIMS. The MDAPs used for this study were not randomly selected, and not all 
MDAPs contained in either DACIMS or DAMIR were selected for analysis. Inclusion 
of MDAPs in this study was based on the availability of relevant data from the two 
databases, DAMIR and DACIMS. Discrepancies between the two databases often 
precluded an MDAP from consideration.  
If an MDAP has a cost threshold breach but the contract is not listed in both 
databases (DACIMS and DAMIR), it is excluded from the data set. This is because 
we need to know the SE/PM cost ratios for the year when the cost threshold breach 
occurred in order to understand the relationship between a breach and the SE/PM 
cost ratio. For an MDAP with no cost threshold breaches, using the SE/PM cost 
ratios for the contracts that are available in the DACIMS database can be done 
without fear of missing a cost threshold breach. 
In many cases, the cost information contained in DAMIR does not match the 
cost information contained DACIMS for the same contract. Cost data as reported in 
the SAR are from the perspective of the government representative, or program 
manager, while cost data contained in the CDSR are reported by the contractor, 
which may account for some of the observed differences. In addition, the CDSR and 
SAR are usually submitted at different times. To eliminate the cost difference 
between the two databases, all cost data were retrieved from the DACIMS library 
(CDSR) and threshold breach data were obtained solely from the DAMIR database 
(SAR).  
The contractor work breakdown structure (CWBS) dictionary contains a 
description of the technical and cost data for the CWBS elements within the contract. 
Because different contractors have slightly different definitions for SE/PM costs, the 
costs reported in the SE/PM category may differ from contract to contract. By 
utilizing the CWBS it is possible, albeit tedious, to ensure to a high degree of 
                                                                                                                                       
contract establishes an estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating of funds and establishes a 
ceiling that the contractor may not exceed without prior approval of the contracting officer (CO). A firm 
fixed price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the 
contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. This type of contract places upon the 
contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides 
maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and imposes a minimum administrative burden 
on the government (DAU, 2011b). 
8 For a more detailed discussion of methodology for collecting data, see Biggs (2013), especially the 
appendix. 
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confidence that the SE/PM costs between contracts in this study are based on the 
same types of WBS elements and reasonably comparable. 
Contract data provided in the CDSR can be initial, interim, or final cost 
information and are submitted according to the contract CDSR plan approved for 
each program. As a result, the frequency of submission for cost data documents 
across different MDAPs varies considerably. To ensure that the cost data collected 
from the CDSR apply to approximately the same period that a cost breach is 
reported in the SAR, the reporting periods for the two documents were verified to be 
within the same calendar year. Otherwise, the program was excluded from the data 
set. A total of 32 MDAPs representing Air Force, Army, Navy, and Joint programs 
since 1988 were included in this study and are listed in the appendix. 
Methodology9 
This research uses binary, clustered, and panel data. Any type of cost 
breach, APB cost breach or Nunn–McCurdy cost breach, is considered the binary-
outcome dependent variable in this analysis: cost breach or no cost breach in a 
given calendar year. The data are clustered based on the different types of 
programs included in the data set (e.g., ship building, aircraft development), and 
observations were collected for a program over a period of years creating panel data 
(SE/PM cost data ratio calculations were recorded by year for each program). There 
are three independent or explanatory variables that were included in the analysis: 
EAC SE/PM cost ratio, time since program initiation (maturity), and program contract 
type (fixed price or cost-plus). While the exact nature of the relationship between 
cost threshold breaches and these explanatory variables is unknown, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the explanatory variables influence the cost performance 
of the MDAPs in some manner.  
To discover a possible relation between the SE/PM cost ratio and cost 
breaches, we could start with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, 
where SE/PM is the independent variable and cost breach is the dependent variable. 
To incorporate maturity and contract type as additional explanatory variables, a 
multiple regression model makes sense. However, it has already been established 
that we are analyzing clustered panel data and that the average SE/PM costs differ 
by program types (see Stem et al., 2006). Thus, a single SE/PM cost ratio value that 
would indicate a cost breach may be of little use to a program manager since there 
is no accounting for the variance across program types.  
Perhaps instead of finding a single SE/PM cost ratio that would presumably 
alert program managers to possibility of an APB or Nunn–McCurdy cost breach, it 
would be more helpful to provide program managers with an indication of the risk of 
                                            
9 For a more detailed study of regression analysis methodology, see Biggs (2013). 
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incurring a cost breach. To do this, we use a logistic regression model, or a 
maximum likelihood estimator such as logit, which uses the natural logarithm of the 
odds ratio. This model is appropriate because it is designed for use with binary-
outcome dependent variables. Additionally, a fixed effects logit model adjusts for 
bias introduced by omitted explanatory variables within the clustered panel data, and 
a population averaged logit model is appropriate for examining across clusters of 
panel data.  
In this study, the pooled OLS regression serves as the baseline model. The 
data are considered pooled because it uses all of the data observations assuming 
they are independent. Unfortunately this assumption skews the calculated standard 
errors for the data. We employ one of several maximum likelihood estimators and 
panel data techniques to address this problem. 
The standard logit model is presented in Equation 5, where Pit represents the 
probability that at a specific time an MDAP breaches a cost threshold, βit is the 
vector of regression coefficient which represents the association of cost breaches 
and the explanatory variable to a unit change in the independent variable (SE/PM 
cost ratio) and x represents the explanatory variable for the respective MDAP. 
     (5) 
The fixed effects (conditional) logit model, which accounts for dependence of 
the observations within a group, modifies the basic logit model and is presented in 
Equation 6. In this equation,  represents a set of fixed constants for each MDAP in 
the group. This model can be considered to describe the impact of short-run 
changes, (i.e., that a change in the SE/PM cost ratio for an MDAP will change its 
probability of breaching a cost threshold). 
    (6) 
 Finally, the relationship between SE/PM cost ratio and cost breach was 
modeled using a population averaged logit model. Unlike the fixed effects method 
that looks within programs for changes in the SE/PM cost ratio, the population 
averaged method looks across programs to measure changes in the SE/PM cost 
ratio. Therefore, in the population averaged logit model, α in Equation 6 represents a 
set of averaged constants for MDAPs across program groups. The population 
averaged method is most useful for measuring long-run effects, (i.e., measuring 
whether programs with high average SE/PM cost ratios are more likely to experience 
a cost breach).  
 it it itLog P /  1 P   x    
 it it itLog P /  1 P     x   
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Results 
For the 32 programs included in this study, Figure 3 shows the total number 
of cost breaches reported for each program compared to the program’s average 
SE/PM cost ratio. 
 
Figure 3. MDAP EAC SE/PM Cost Ratio Versus Cost Breaches 
(Biggs, 2013) 
It appears that more than half of the MDAPs maintain an EAC SE/PM cost 
ratio of 0.20 or less and have experienced less than two cost breaches since 1998. 
Furthermore, it can be inferred that most of the programs have experienced at least 
one cost breach and these inferences seems to confirm a recent RAND report which 
found that most MDAPs’ actual costs exceeded baseline cost estimates (Arena et 
al., 2006).10  
Observations of the MDAP SE/PM cost ratios in this report seem to concur 
with the RAND study which suggests that trends in SE/PM costs vary across MDAPs 
(Stem et al., 2006). For this reason, it is challenging to identify relationships between 
SE/PM costs and cost breaches. The average EAC SE/PM cost ratio for the sample 
data set of 32 MDAPs is 0.16. This suggests that on average, program managers of 
the MDAPs studied in this report spent 16% of their budgets on systems engineering 
and program management activities. Recall that the systems engineering and 
program management costs are used as proxy measures of the transaction costs 
required to administer and to manage the MDAP. 
                                            
10 For most of the programs reviewed, actual costs exceeded the baseline cost estimate established 
at Milestone II (program initiation), as measured by the cost growth factor (Arena et al., 2006). 
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A histogram of the EAC SE/PM cost ratios observed in this study is shown in 
Figure 4. From this histogram we can observe that while most observed ratios varied 
between 0.05 and 0.35, there do appear to be two outliers having values of 0.50. 
 
Figure 4. EAC SE/PM Cost Ratio Histogram for MDAPs 
(Biggs, 2013) 
Note. Study data from Biggs is available on request. 
SE/PM Cost Ratios 
To understand the results of our analysis, it will be helpful to consider the 
following linear model used to explore the effect of the independent variables on cost 
breaches:  
Y = α + β0X0 + βiXi.      (7) 
For this linear model, βo is the regression coefficient that will be associated 
with the independent variable (EAC SE/PM cost ratio), and βi is the regression 
coefficient that will be associated with all other explanatory variables. The dependent 
variable, Y, represents the likelihood of a cost breach occurring. The constant α 
represents the value of the probability of a cost breach occurring when there are no 
explanatory variables (Xi) and EAC SE/PM cost ratio (X0) is zero (Hutcheson, 2011). 
Accordingly, for the first series of data tests, the equation for the model being tested 
is 
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Y = α + β0X0       (8) 
 X0 = EAC SE/PM cost ratio    
The hypothesis being tested is that the probability of a program sustaining a 
cost threshold breach is related to the EAC SE/PM cost ratio of the MDAP. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no relation between the probability of a cost threshold 
breach and the EAC SE/PM cost ratio and that the model has no explanatory power. 
The results of the regression models based on the SE/PM ratio are shown in 
Table 2. The OLS regression and logit population averaged regression models 
indicate a positive relationship that is significant at the 5% level (p = .05) between 
EAC SE/PM cost ratio and the likelihood of a cost breach occurring. Since we 
established in the previous chapter that the OLS regression does not adequately 
model the data and the logit fixed effects (FE) model is not significant, only the logit 
population averaged (PA) regression results are further examined. 
Table 2. Impact of EAC SE/PM Ratio on Likelihood of Cost Breach 
 
The marginal effect of the logit population averaged model shows that, based 
on across programs observations, for every unit change in EAC SE/PM, the log odds 
rise in the probability of a cost breach occurring is 0.80. This means that for every 1% 
increase or decrease in the EAC SE/PM cost ratio, there is an average increase or 
decrease of 0.8% in the probability of a program sustaining a cost threshold breach. 
In logistic regression, the value of the marginal effect is not constant and must be 
interpreted accordingly. For example, in Table 2 when the EAC SE/PM cost ratio is 
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0.1, the marginal effect on the likelihood of a cost threshold breach is 0.76. When 
the EAC SE/PM cost ratio is equal to 0.1, a 1% increase in the EAC SE/PM cost 
ratio will positively correspond to a 0.76% increase in the likelihood of a cost 
threshold breach occurring.  
It is interesting to note that the logit fixed effects model which looks within 
programs does not show correlation between EAC SE/PM and cost breaches. This 
seems to suggest that within a program the likelihood of a program incurring a cost 
threshold breach cannot be associated to the EAC SE/PM cost ratio. 
The logit population averaged model provides a long-term look across 
programs and yields statistically significant results for associating cost breaches to 
EAC SE/PM cost ratio. The across programs look can be interpreted as 
indiscriminately considering all DoD MDAPs in the data set, regardless of the 
program’s affiliation with a specific service or weapons type. The results suggest that, 
in general, the probability of a cost breach occurring is related to the EAC SE/PM 
cost ratio.  
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between EAC SE/PM cost ratio and the 
likelihood of cost breaches for the population averaged model.  
 
Figure 5. Cost Breach Versus SE/PM Logistic Regression S-Curve 
(Biggs, 2013) 
The regression s-curve in Figure 5 indicates that an increase or decrease in 
the EAC SE/PM cost ratio is associated with a corresponding increase or decrease 
in the probability of a cost breach occurring.  
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SE/PM Cost Ratios and Program Maturity 
The program maturity, considered in this report to be the length of time (in 
years) since the requisite program contracts entered Milestone B, was used to 
expand the model. We are interested in the impact of EAC SE/PM cost ratio on the 
likelihood of a cost breach occurring while including the explanatory variable Log 
Maturity, the logarithm of the maturity variable (taking the natural log of maturity 
helps to linearize the relation of maturity to cost breaches in this model): 
Y = α + β0X0 + β1X1     (9) 
 X0 = EAC SE/PM Cost Ratio     
X1 = Log Maturity       
The null hypothesis is that there is no relation of cost breaches with EAC 
SE/PM cost ratio and program maturity as defined in this report. The analysis is 
modeled by logit fixed effects and logit population averaged models and the resulting 
impact of the explanatory variable Log Maturity is displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Impact of EAC SE/PM With Log Maturity 
 
While maturity does not have a statistically significant effect in any of the 
models, the SE/PM ratio is significant at the 5% (p = .05) level in the logit population 
averaged (PA) model. The average marginal effect of the EAC SE/PM cost ratio is 
0.89, which means that a one unit (1%) change in the EAC SE/PM cost ratio of an 
MDAP will result in a 0.89% change in the likelihood of an MDAP incurring a cost 
breach. The practical interpretation of these results may be that SE/PM costs 
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become a larger percentage of the total program costs due to the proactive or 
reactive actions of the program manager to avoid a cost threshold breach. Thus, 
there is evidence to suggest that the SE/PM cost ratio may be an indicator of cost 
troubles. 
SE/PM Cost Ratios, Program Maturity, and Contract Type 
Finally, we examine the impact of the type of contract on the likelihood of a 
cost breach occurring. The null hypothesis of this analysis is that there is no relation 
between cost breaches and EAC SE/PM cost ratio, log maturity, and MDAP contract 
type. The linear equation model that analyzes the impact of EAC SE/PM on the 
likelihood of a cost breach occurring while including the explanatory variables Log 
Maturity and MDAP contract type is 
Y = α + β0X0 + β1X1 + β2X2 (10) 
 X0 = EAC SE/PM Cost Ratio     
X1 = Log Maturity       
X2 = Contract Type       
For this model, firm-fixed price contracts have β2 = 0, and cost-plus contracts have 
β2 = 1.  
Table 4 shows the marginal effects of the independent and explanatory 
variables for programs with fixed price and cost-plus contracts. In this model, the 
effect of maturity was statistically significant at the 5% (p = .05) level and effect of 
the EAC SE/PM cost ratio was significant at the 10% (p = .10) level for programs 
with cost-plus contracts. For cost-plus contract programs, the average marginal 
effect of Log Maturity is 0.21, and for EAC SE/PM cost ratio is 1.00. This means that 
for a one unit (1%) change in the Log Maturity the likelihood of a cost breach 
occurring will change by 0.21%, and for a one unit (1%) change in the EAC SE/PM 
cost ratio the likelihood of a cost breach occurring will change by 1%. 
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Table 4. Logistic Regression With Log Maturity and Contract Type 
 
In summary, we looked at the SE/PM cost ratios, maturity, contract type, and 
cost breaches for 32 MDAPs during the period of 1998 to 2011. Based on the results 
of the analysis, using the population averaged logit model to look across programs 
seems most useful. This is probably due to the population averaged model making 
longer term observations, whereas the fixed effects model is making short-term 
observations. We find a positive relationship that is significant at the 5% (p = .05) 
level between the likelihood of a cost breach occurring and the EAC SE/PM cost 
ratio. On average, for a 1% increase in the SE/PM cost ratio there is a 
corresponding 0.80% increase in the likelihood that a cost breach will occur. For 
cost-plus contracts, the effect of maturity was statistically significant at the 5% (p = 
.05) level and the model had the largest average marginal effects of EAC SE/PM 
cost ratio, with a 1% increase in the EAC SE/PM cost ratio corresponding to a 1% 
increase in the likelihood of a cost breach at a significance level of 10% (p = .10).  
Conclusions 
This research is based on the assumption that there are real costs 
(transaction costs) associated with managing and monitoring an MDAP which may 
not be accounted for in traditional cost estimates. This study tried to determine (1) if 
there is a correlation between these transaction costs and acquisition cost threshold 
breaches; and (2) if cost threshold breaches are related to the amount, or proportion 
of total costs, that are spent on program transaction costs. The data set included 
major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) with 10% (or greater) cost threshold 
breaches. Logit population averaged regression analysis yielded statistically 
significant results for the EAC SE/PM cost ratio by itself and for Log Maturity and 
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EAC SE/PM cost ratio in programs with cost-plus contracts. These contracts 
exhibited relationships between (1) the estimate at completion (EAC) system 
engineering/program management (SE/PM) cost ratio and the likelihood of a cost 
breach occurring; and (2) the log maturity and the likelihood of a cost breach 
occurring. 
The results show that as the EAC SE/PM cost ratio rises there is a statistically 
significant corresponding increase in the probability of a cost threshold breach 
occurring. This provides answers to both of these research questions. First, the 
statistically significant correspondence between the variables infers that correlation 
exists. Second, the relation between cost threshold breaches and the amount of 
transaction costs is confirmed because as the relative amount of transaction costs 
for an MDAP increases, the likelihood of the occurrence of a cost threshold breach 
also increases. 
If the original cost estimate did not account for transaction costs and those 
transaction costs are high, it is possible the missing (i.e., unestimated) transaction 
costs are contributing to the cost overrun. In other words, if transaction costs are 
high and they were not part of the program baseline or BAC, then they may account 
for at least part of the difference between the BAC and the estimate at completion 
(EAC) which may eventually lead to a cost breach. However, the correlation found in 
our analysis does not suggest causality, but merely that a relationship exists. 
It is reasonable to assume that the SE/PM cost ratio is a symptom associated 
with risky, complex programs. Higher transactions may be the result of program 
management activities intended to reduce risk in complex programs, which by their 
nature are more likely to experience cost overruns. Just like the temperature of a 
patient can indicate an infection, the temperature itself is not the cause of the 
infection. Rather, the body’s efforts to fight the infection cause the temperature to 
increase. The doctor measures the patient’s temperature to evaluate the probability 
of an infection. In a similar fashion, program managers may be able to measure the 
SE/PM cost ratio to assess the probability of a cost breach. 
Understanding the significance of transaction costs in life-cycle cost 
estimation may lead to better life-cycle cost estimates for MDAPs. In addition, 
understanding the relationship between the SEPM cost ratio and cost breaches 
could help program managers understand and potentially predict possible cost 
overruns, which may lead to better cost risk management in DoD acquisitions. 
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Appendix 
PROGRAMS SELECTED FOR STUDY 
Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar 
AIM-9X/Short Range Air-to-Air Missile 
AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) 
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF JTRS) 
AN/WQR-3, Advanced Deployable System (ADS) 
Apache Block IIIA Remanufacture (AB3A REMANUFACTURE) 
AV-8B/Attack, V/STOL, Close Air Support (Harrier II+ Remanufacture) 
B-2 Radar Modernization Program 
Cobra Judy Replacement (Cobra Judy Replacement) 
EA-18G Growler (EA-18G) 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 
E-3 AWACS Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) 
E-2C Reproduction 
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) 
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System/DPICM/Unitary/Alternative Warhead 
(GMLRS/GMLRS AW) 
Joint Common Missile (JCM) 
Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (formerly Cluster 1) 
(JTRS GMR) 
Longbow Hellfire—subsystem of the AH-64 Apache Weapon System 
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship 
MQ-4C Unmanned Aircraft System Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (MQ-4C 
UAS BAMS) 
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) 
National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 
Presidential Helicopter Replacement (VH-71) Program 
P-8A Poseidon 
Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) 
Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) 
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Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program 
Standard Missile (SM)–2 Block IV 
Stryker Family of Vehicles (STRYKER) 
UH-72A Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) 
Warfighter Information Network–Tactical (WIN-T) 
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